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ADDRESS 



DELIVERED IN BOSTON 

BEFORE 

THE HOOKER ASSOCIATION 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 

BY 

MAJ -GEN. DANIEL EDGAR SICKLES 

U. S. ARMY, RETIRED 
NOVEMBEE 29, 1910 



NORWOOD PRESS 

NORWOOD, MASS. 




GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER 



ADDRESS 



DELIVERED IN BOSTON 

BEFORE 

THE HOOKER ASSOCIATION 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 

BY 

MAJ -GEN. DANIEL EDGAE SICKLES 

U. S. ARMY, RETIRED 
NOVEMBER 29, 1910 



NORWOOD PRESS 

NORWOOD, MASS. 



f1 




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ADDRESS 

Comrades and Gentlemen : — I am glad to be here 
this evening in the presence of so many members of 
the Hooker Association of Massachusetts, one of the 
largest and most influential military organizations in 
America. Through your courtesy it will be my pleas- 
ure to talk to you about General Hooker and his 
campaigns. He was a hero in three wars, — Semi- 
nole, Mexican and the War of the Rebellion, the 
greatest conflict of modern times. 

This is a labor of love for me. At least, I am sure 
to-night of a sympathetic audience, for you all loved 
Hooker as I did, and you all appreciated and admired 
him. How fortunate Hooker has been in the devoted 
friends he has left behind him to cherish his memory ! 
You and I have been often pained to hear his critics 
— and they are not few — pass over all his brilliant 
exploits in many battles and dwell upon the unsatis- 
factory result of one. They ignore his faithful and 
victorious service in three wars, and recall only the 
one battle in which he was not fortunate. - 

Our loyalty to the memory of Hooker is a sentiment 
in which affection and admiration are blended. His 
comrades loved him because he made them good 
soldiers, — because he gave them confidence in 
themselves. They loved him because they knew he 

1 



was fond of them, — proud of them, — jealous of 
their honor and fame. We admired him as the in- 
trepid brigade, division, corps, and army commander, 
whose white plume was always in the front line of 
battle. We admired his fearless bearing, his pic- 
turesque figure in the saddle, at the head of a column, 
or on the fighting line, — a type of soldier v/ho shared 
every peril to which his command was exposed. We 
admired him for his thorough knowledge of his pro- 
fession, from the duty of an enlisted man to the re- 
sponsibilities of a commander. 

Hooker and I first met in Washington in July, '61, 
a few days after the battle of Bull Run. He was 
seeking employment for his sword. He had re- 
signed from the army after the War with Mexico, 
and settled in California. He intended to devote 
himself to the pursuits of peace, but, like many an- 
other good soldier, he had not much aptitude for 
business. On the breaking out of the war of seces- 
sion he felt it to be his duty, as a loyal graduate of 
West Point, to offer his services to the Government. 
He came to Washington for that purpose, about the 
same time Grant was lingering near McClellan's 
headquarters in Cincinnati, seeking in vain recogni- 
tion and employment. I had raised and equipped 
five regiments for the war ; they had been two months 
in camp on Staten Island, in the Bay of New York ; 
they were ready to take the field, but the Govern- 
ment hesitated to muster them into service. It was 
said by unscrupulous partisans and a few newspapers 
that troops raised by Sickles or other Democrats 



would march over to Jeff Davis in the first battle in 
which they were engaged. My commission was not 
issued. I had fed and clothed five thousand men for 
two weeks, supplying them with tents, camp and 
garrison equipage, shoes, and blankets, and muskets 
for instruction and drill and guard duty. 

When Hooker heard this and learned that so large 
a body of effective troops were within a few hours of 
Washington, and were held back from the defense 
of the Capitol by mere political prejudices, he ex- 
claimed : 

" The Union can never be restored on these lines ! 
If I had held your command in reserve at Bull Run, 
I would have won that battle in ten minutes. I will 
see the President about this to-morrow." 

President Lincoln sent for me the next day. He 
said : 

''We can't succeed in this war if only the men of 
one party take up arms for the Union. I hope to see 
men of all parties — Democrats and Republicans — 
in the army and navy. We can't have too many 
Democrats in the ranks nor in important commands. 
If men enlist under Democratic leaders, it is because 
they enjoy the confidence of those who follow their 
patriotic example." 

My command was at once mustered into service 
and ordered to Washington. My commission as 
Colonel of the First Regiment of ''United States 
Volunteers" was issued. Thus began my acquaint- 



ance with Hooker, and then began my career in the 
War for the Union. 

When the Army of the Potomac was organized, 
Hooker was assigned to the command of the second 
division of the Third Army Corps under Heintzelman. 
My brigade was included in Hooker's division. In 
March, '62, Hooker and his division embarked with 
the Army of the Potomac on transports for York- 
town, to enter upon the Peninsular campaign under 
General McClellan. The battle of Williamsburg, 
on the 5th of May, '62, — a Third Army Corps 
battle, — was the first proof given to the country 
of the martial character of the Army of the Potomac. 
The Third Army Corps, under Heintzelman, Hooker 
and Kearny, set its standard high in that engagement, 
and always maintained it to the end. Williamsburg 
was the bloody baptism of the Third Army Corps. 
For that reason we chose it as the anniversary of the 
Third Army Corps reunions. For nearly fifty years 
we have commemorated every recurrence of the 5th 
of May. It is the oldest military association of the 
Union armies, having been organized at Brandy Sta- 
tion September 2, 1863. I may say here that the 
severest loss of the day at Williamsburg, in any regi- 
ment, was suffered by the first regiment of my bri- 
gade, — Colonel William Dwight of Massachusetts 
commanding, — one of the five regiments raised by me 
and of which I was the first Colonel. It was called 
^^ Sickles' Own." This regiment went into its first 
battle with thirty-three officers and seven hundred 
men. It fought, for four hours, more than three 



times its numbers, losing twenty-two officers, in- 
cluding the Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, and 
an aggregate loss of three hundred and thirty. 

Hooker had no patience with that class of com- 
manders who never move without ''orders," — too 
often a convenient excuse for doing nothing. He 
never looked with indifference upon troops hard 
pressed by the enemy. His chivalrous nature at once 
sent him forward with help. He was stung to the 
quick when he found masses of men held back by 
their chiefs, while he was contending against superior 
forces. In his report of the battle of Williamsburg 
he exclaimed, — and I can recall his emotion when he 
read these words to me, — 

''History will not be believed when it relates that 
the noble officers and men of my division were per- 
mitted to carry on their unequal struggle that day in 
the presence of more than thirty thousand of their 
com.rades, with arms in their hands, who had not fired 
a shot. Nevertheless, it is true. If we failed to de- 
stroy the rebel army on the plateau of Williamsburg, 
it surely will not be ascribed to the want of courage 
or steadfastness in my command." 

In the subsequent battles of the Peninsular cam- 
paign, — Fair Oaks, Oak Ridge, Glendale, Malvern 
Hill and others, — Hooker and his division won 
their full share of honors. After the disasters of 
Pope's campaign, when McClellan was restored to 
the command of the Army of the Potomac, Hooker 
was assigned to the command of the First Army 
Corps. 



6 



McClellan, a great soldier, tells the story of Hooker 
at Antietam. No one knew it so well. - McClellan 
wrote to Hooker three days after the battle : 

^^Had you not been wounded when you were, I 
believe the result of the battle would have been the 
entire destruction of the rebel army, for / know that, 
with you at its head, your Corps would have kept 
on until it gained the main road. As a slight ex- 
pression of what I think you merit, I have requested 
that the Brigadier General's commission in the regu- 
lar army, vacant by Mansfield's death, may be given 
to you." - 

Hooker was at once made a Brigadier General in 
the regular army to date from the day this letter was 
written, thus crowning the ambition of the brilliant 
young adjutant of the battalion of cadets at West 
Point.i 

When Hooker was assigned to the command of the 
Army of the Potomac in January, '63, that army had 
fallen to an extreme depth of demoralization. Three 
thousand officers and more than eighty thousand 

1 Since the delivery of this speech, on November 29, 1910, my 
attention has been called to a review of Major Bigelow's "Com- 
mentary on the Chancellors ville Campaign," which appeared in 
the New York Sun of November 6, signed "J. M. W." The re- 
viewer charges Hooker with skulking from the battle of Antietam, 
on the pretense that he was disabled by a wound. The absurdity 
of this preposterous accusation is shown by the letter of General 
McClellan, which is quoted above, in the text. Perhaps the illus- 
trious reviewer, whose name I do not know, may now accuse Mc- 
Clellan of a conspiracy with Hooker to obtain for Hooker the 
appointment of Brigadier General in the Regular Army, on false 
pretenses I Malice can go no further I 



men were absent without leave. Desertions num- 
bered at least two hundred a day. The army had 
failed in several campaigns. Three commanders 
had been superseded. Recruiting had come to a 
halt. Reenf or cements were not in sight. The Proc- 
lamation of Emancipation had put a new phase on 
the war. It had greatly divided public opinion in the 
North ; it had spread dissensions in the army, dis- 
couraging reenlistments among the two-year men 
whose term of service was about to expire. Hooker 
soon changed all this. He brought back the absen- 
tees; he restored the morale of the army, reviving 
confidence in itself and its leader ; he gave his army 
incessant occupation, — the best remedy for demor- 
alization; and in April, '63, it was as strong and 
efficient for another campaign as it had been at any 
period of the war. 

Hooker was no politician ; he was a patriot ; his 
whole soul was intent on the preservation of the 
Union. He was ambitious as a soldier, it is true, 
but his ambition was to be foremost in achieving suc- 
cess for our cause. He was devoted to the support 
of Lincoln, and praised enthusiastically his Emanci- 
pation Proclamation. In this he differed very 
much from other prominent commanders who had 
little faith in Lincoln's ability as a ruler, and regarded 
his Emancipation Proclamation as ill-timed and too 
radical a measure. They shared McClellan's belief 
that we should make a compromise with the South, 
leaving slavery intact. 

While Hooker was the idol of the soldiers, he was 



8 

not liked by many prominent commanders, such as 
Scott, Halleck, Grant, Sherman, Meade, Reynolds 
and others. Sherman went so far as to threaten his 
resignation if Hooker were appointed to the com- 
mand of the Army of the Tennessee, made vacant 
when McPherson was killed. Soon after the battle 
of ''Peach Tree Creek, '^ in which Hooker was dis- 
tinguished, Sherman met Hooker near his head- 
quarters. In the conversation that followed about 
the battle. Hooker spoke with much feeling of his 
serious losses in the engagement. 
^'I am mourning over the loss of two thousand of 
my brave men,'^ said Hooker. 

Sherman replied, ''Oh, most of them will turn up 
when 'Grub Time' comes around !" 

Hooker's face betrayed his anger, but he said noth- 
ing. 
^ Grant evidently intended, when Hooker was under 
his command in the autumn of '63, in Tennessee, that 
Hooker should be only a spectator of the battle of 
Missionary Ridge. Grant took the Eleventh Army 
Corps away from Hooker and left him isolated with 
a small force in Wauhatchie Valley. But fortune 
favored Hooker. By the carrying away of a bridge 
across the Tennessee River, at Brown's Ferry, 
Hooker retained detachments from three army 
corps. With these augmented forces he won the 
battle of Lookout Mountain ; and on the following 
day, quickly repairing the bridge, he crossed Chatta- 
nooga Creek with his troops, and successfully as- 
saulted the left flank of Bragg' s army, thus sharing 



9 



conspicuously in the battles of that great campaign, 
for which he has never received half the credit due 
him. ■' 

Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Mission- 
ary Ridge, referring to Hooker's assault on his left 
flank, says : 

^' About this time I learned that our extreme left 
had also given way and that my position was almost 
surrounded.". . . ''AH to the left, however, except 
a portion of Bates' division, was entirely routed 
and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having 
been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. 
Every effort which could be made by myself and 
staff and by many other mounted officers availed but 
little. A panic such as I had never before witnessed 
seemed to have seized upon men and officers, and 
each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, 
regardless of his duty or his character. In this dis- 
tressing and alarming state of affairs, General Bates 
was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for 
the retreat of Breckenridge's command, and orders 
were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and 
Breckenridge to retire their forces upon the depot 
at Chickamauga." 

Hooker's victory over Longstreet at Wauhatchie 
was one of the most important engagements, in the 
southwest, during the war. It opened up com- 
munication with Thomas' base of supplies, and saved 
his army from starvation and surrender. 

The hostility of Halleck, Commander-in-Chief of 
all the Armies, was shown in the Gettysburg cam- 
paign, when Hooker asked that the garrison at Har- 
per's Ferry — ten thousand men — should be re- 



10 



lieved and sent to him as a reenforcement for the 
approaching battle. Halleck curtly refused this 
request, saying that Harper's Ferry must be held and 
its garrison retained in its full strength. Hooker 
thereupon asked to be relieved of the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, intimating that it was appar- 
ent he no longer retained the confidence of the 
Government, which was vital to the success of any 
commander of an army. The following day, when 
Meade was assigned to the command, he renewed the 
same request, and it was at once granted without hesi- 
tation, furnishing the most obvious proof of personal 
hostility to Hooker and of favoritism to Meade, 
his successor. Hooker then asked that he might be 
assigned to the command of the Fifth Army Corps in 
the Army of the Potomac, which had been just va- 
cated by Meade. This chivalrous desire to share the 
perils and fortunes of the Army was repelled and de- 
nied by Halleck. Similar hostility was afterwards 
shown by Halleck when Hooker asked to be relieved 
of the command of the Twentieth Corps in Sherman's 
Army. Hooker requested that he might be assigned 
to the command of his old division in the Army of the 
Potomac under Grant, in June, '64, and this too was 
refused. No better evidence could be given of the 
hostility shown to this brilliant and faithful soldier, 
prompted by personal dislike and prejudice. 

The most successful commanders in our armies 
have been those who have had the most confidence 
in their volunteer forces. From Bennington, in 
the Revolutionary War, to Appomattox, from Stark 



11 



to Grant, this has been the secret of success. The 
armies of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas — 
Hke the Army of the Potomac — were almost wholly 
made up of volunteers. Their best work was done 
by volunteers. These great leaders all learned to 
confide in their volunteers. Hooker was foremost in 
the Army of the Potomac for his confidence in volun- 
teers. The troops under his command were nearly 
all volunteers. He believed them capable of any- 
thing that soldiers could do ; he exercised great 
personal influence over them, and for him they would 
perform miracles. Hooker and Kearny created the 
Third Army Corps. I was fortunate in being their 
successor. I inherited from them the command of 
volunteers, made good soldiers under their supervi- 
sion. Of the three hundred regiments of the Union 
army most conspicuous for distinguished conduct and 
for the largest losses suffered in battle, as enumer- 
ated by Colonel W. F. Fox in his Historical Summary, 
forty-three are taken from the roster of the Third 
Army Corps. There were twenty-five corps of In- 
fantry in the army, besides the Cavalry and Artillery. 
It therefore appears that about one sixth of the best 
fighting battalions in our service were pupils of Third 
Army Corps commanders. 

Besides the admirable compilation of Colonel Fox, 
let me commend to your perusal the late General 
St. Clair Mulholland's work, entitled The American 
Volunteer, in which he points out a great number 
of regiments of volunteers that served in our armies 
in the War of the Rebellion, that lost in killed and 



12 

wounded, in one battle, fifty per cent and more of the 
number taken into action, — a record without a paral- 
lel in any other war in any part of the world. ^^The 
armies of England," he says, ''did great deeds during 
the centuries past ; the veterans of Napoleon left the 
memory of their splendid fighting on many gory fields, 
— but the volunteers of America, both in individual 
heroism and in the gallantry shown by them as organ- 
izations, surpasses any army that ever marched on 
earth. Not in the history of the world," he adds, 
''is there a record of any regiment or battery losing 
fifty per cent in killed and wounded in a single battle, 
until our War of the Rebellion." 

Nor are his researches confined to the Union ar- 
mies. He cites the splendid record of the Twenty- 
sixth North Carolina regiment at Gettysburg, 
where it lost in killed and wounded, on the first 
day, 71tV per cent of the eight hundred and twenty 
officers and men it took into action. Thirty-four of 
its thirty-nine officers were killed or wounded ! Nor 
does MulhoUand limit himself to the records of the 
white regiments in the opposing armies. He cites 
regiments and brigades of our colored troops that 
lost fifty per cent and more in killed and wounded 
in one battle. The American Volunteer is a book 
that should be in every library in America. It should 
be read and studied in every school and college in 
every state from which our volunteers were drawn. 
It is an inspiration to every American. 

In his conception of military operations, Hooker 
was audacious, ingenious, original, acute ; in executing 



13 



them he was energetic, yet circumspect and prudent. 
He was severe in discipline, exacting in his demands 
upon officers and men ; lofty in his ideal of the sol- 
dier's intrepidity, fortitude, earnestness and zeal; 
yet he was generous in praise ; quick to see and recog- 
nize ability and merit as well in the ranks of an ad- 
versary as in his own. He never underestimated the 
Army of Northern Virginia. He often said that the 
discipline of Lee's army made it incomparably the 
most efficient force, of its numbers, ever organized. 
He never ceased to lament that the gentle, tender 
nature of Lincoln, the martyr, made it impossible 
to impose upon our armies the rigorous discipline 
maintained in the rebel forces. The government of 
Davis, the rebel ruler, was a military despotism, 
inspired by his military training from boyhood. 

Let us now devote a few minutes to the battle of 
Chancellorsville, about which Hooker's critics are 
so fond of talking, and of which they too often 
show gross ignorance. The truth is that the cam- 
paign of Chancellorsville is not understood by most 
of those who criticize Hooker's management of it. 

First, let me point out that the disparity of num- 
bers — sixty thousand under Lee, and more than a 
hundred thousand under Hooker — is more apparent 
than real. The illustrious Longstreet, Lee's ablest 
lieutenant, in his comments on the Chancellorsville 
campaign says : 

'^Lee had interior lines of defense, while his adver- 
sary occupied exterior lines and was divided by two 
crossings of the Rappahannock, which made Lee's 



14 

sixty thousand for defense about equal to one hun- 
dred and thirteen thousand under Hooker." 

Chancellorsville was a drawn battle, the losses on 
each side being about equal, except that the rebel 
loss was greater in prominent officers. The number 
of battle flags and prisoners taken on either side was 
nearly the same. I captured seven flags on the 3d 
of May. No strategic advantage of any importance 
was gained on either side. The Army of the Potomac 
still remained competent to win Gettysburg, as it did 
win it. And had Hooker remained in command of 
that army, we would have reaped the advantages of 
the victory at Gettysburg by a prompt and energetic 
counter attack and pursuit on the third day, which 
we failed to secure under Meade. 

There are several noticeable resemblances between 
the operations of Napoleon at Wagram and of 
Hooker at Chancellorsville. Both threw large bodies 
of troops across a river between sunset and dawn, in 
the face of vigilant enemies. The passage of the 
Danube by Napoleon and of the Rappahannock and 
the Rapidan by Hooker are pointed out at our Mili- 
tary Academy as the most instructive examples of 
such movements. Both commanders failed to profit 
by the surprise of their adversaries. The Archduke 
Charles, as soon as daylight revealed the presence of 
the French army, fell back to a strong position from 
which his Austrians repulsed their impetuous and 
confident assailants. Hooker took up a defensive 
position in the Wilderness, to await the capture of 
Fredericksburg by Sedgwick and his junction with 



15 

the main army. Wagram and Chancellorsville were 
drawn battles, leaving both armies effective in 
morale, material and strength. There is, however, 
this important difference, — the commanding gen- 
eral of the Union army was disabled and made un- 
conscious by a serious injury, from which he never 
afterwards fully recovered. This misfortune left the 
Army of the Potomac without a head. During the 
critical hours of the battle of Chancellorsville, on 
May 3, 1863, Hooker was tortured by pain, and 
unable to conmaand. In these precious hours the 
battle was undecisive. - 

Chancellorsville was a battle fraught with ill- 
fortune. Hooker's star failed him, for once. A dozen 
^^ifs" happened, without fault on the part of Hooker, 
and these '4fs," all going the wrong way, turned the 
day to one barren of results : 

1st : ^^If '' Stoneman, with his ten thousand cavalry, 
had not failed in his raid on Lee's lines of com- 
munication with Richmond, — Lee's base of 
supplies, — an inexcusable failure never fully 
explained; Stoneman's movement was ordered 
by Hooker as an essential preliminary to his 
campaign. It was expected to force Lee out of 
Fredericksburg towards Gordonsville or Rich- 
mond. Stoneman was ordered by Hooker to 
send a daily report of Lee's movements but he 
did not obey that order. 

2d : '^If " Sedgwick had pushed forward energetically 
from Fredericksburg and had joined Hooker 



16 

at Chancellorsville, as he should have done, 
Hooker would have moved out of the Wilderness 
on Lee's lines of communication ; 

3d : "If" Howard had guarded his right flank with 
vigilance, thereby saving his corps from the dis- 
aster that followed his neglect ; Howard had 
distinct and timely notice from Hooker to be 
prepared for attack ; 

4th: ''If" I could have been reenforced at the 
''Furnace" by Hooker, before Jackson struck 
Howard; I had three divisions posted in a strong 
position, between Lee and Jackson ; Lee had 
divided his army into two wings, about thirty 
thousand men each (one wing under Jackson 
and the other under Lee in person), placing 
them beyond supporting distance of each other, 
so that both wings could have been attacked 
simultaneously, — Jackson's wing by my forces, 
and Lee's wing by the main army under 
Hooker, — Lee's defeat would have certainly 
followed. 

5th : "If" Hooker had not been " knocked out" and 
left unconscious while standing on the porch of 
Chancellor House, his headquarters, thereby 
leaving his army without a head, in the very 
crisis of the battle; 

6th : " If " I had been reenforced on Sunday morning, 
May 3, when I was fighting double my num- 
bers and had held my ground until I had fired 
my last shot, — a reenforcement that was im- 
possible so far as Hooker was concerned, as he 



17 

was unconscious and speechless and could give 
no order ; 

7th : ^^If " Couch, commanding the Second Corps, or 
Reynolds of the First Corps, or Meade of the 
Fifth Corps, had helped me — as they might have 
done — with two or three brigades out of fifty 
thousand men under their command who had 
not yet fired a shot, when Stuart, who succeeded 
Jackson, was already torn to pieces by the fire 
of the Third and Twelfth Corps; 

8th : ^^If " Couch, the senior Corps commander, had 
taken the reins of command in his hands when 
Hooker was paralyzed, Chancellorsville would 
have been a Union victory; 

9th : And "if' the storm that fell upon us the day 
after Hooker's wound, carrying away all but one 
of our pontoon bridges on the Rappahannock, had 
not happened, we might have held safely our com- 
munications, brought up subsistence and am- 
munition from the northern side of the river, at 
Falmouth, continued the campaign after Hooker 
revived, and won the victory in spite of all our 
misfortunes. 

But, alas ! this was not to be. In the providence 
of God the day had not yet come for Gettysburg, 
or Vicksburg, or Lookout Mountain, or Missionary 
Ridge ; nor for Grant, nor Spotsylvania, nor Appo- 
mattox. 

The best proof that victory was in our grasp on 
Sunday morning, the 3d of May, is found in the fact 



18 

that after I had fired my last round of infantry am- 
munition and was obhged to fall back to my second 
fortified position, my rear guard was not pressed. 
The enemy, under Stuart, the successor of Jackson, 
followed my forces in a mob, without formation. Ob- 
serving this, I directed Captain Seeley of Battery K, 
Fourth United States Artillery,^ to take position on the 
flank of the advancing crowd under Stuart and give 
them a few parting rounds of grape and canister. At 
the same time I ordered General Sewell, commanding 
my rear guard, composed of the Second New Jersey 
Brigade, to about face and charge Stuart's mob with 
the bayonet as soon as Seeley had fired a dozen rounds 
of grape and canister. This bayonet charge was made 
energetically and gallantly by Sewell and his com- 
mand, and he captured more prisoners than he had 
men under him, and seven battle flags besides. 

You can thus plainly see what would have been the 
result if I could have brought up three fresh brigades, 
— say, seven thousand men, with ample ammunition, 
and their bayonets in reserve, charging upon Stuart's 
demoralized and exhausted troops. Victory would 
have been ours. 

Returning from Chancellorsville, Hooker asked 
me, ^^What will be said of my campaign?" 

I replied: ^^ Military critics — and commanders 
whom you have criticized — may say that you 
should not have divided your army in three parts, 
beyond supporting distance of each other, sending 
your cavalry corps on a fruitless raid towards Rich- 
1 He died December 30, 1910, at Sawtelle, California. 



19 



mond, leaving your main army blindfolded in the 
Wilderness ; it may be said that you should have 
brought up Sedgwick and his four strong divisions from 
the north bank of the Rappahannock, as soon as he 
had served your purpose of deceiving the enemy about 
your plan of crossing the river, so that your whole 
army would have been united and ready for battle ; 
it may be said that, instead of sitting down in the 
Wilderness, where you could see nothing and do noth- 
ing, you should have advanced your army to the 
open ground, on Lee's communications, in a strong 
position for defense, thereby forcing Lee to take the 
offensive ; it may be said that you should not have 
established your headquarters under fire, at Chancel- 
lor House, as if you were commanding a brigade and 
not an army of over a hundred thousand men, and 
that in this, as in the separation of your army in 
three parts, you forgot the admonition of Lincoln : 
' Beware of rashness and over-confidence ^ ; it may 
be said that on the instant, on May 2, when you 
learned that Lee had divided his army, you should 
have attacked Jackson with all of your available 
forces, drawn from the First, Second, Third and Fifth 
Army Corps, directing Sedgwick at the same time to 
assail Lee energetically — as by so doing you would 
have destroyed Jackson and forced Lee to surrender." 

Hooker said, ^^How easy it is to fight a battle after 
it has been fought !'^ 

There are other examples of battles decided by 
accidents or '4fs." For an instance of this, recall 
what happened at Waterloo. 



20 



^'//'' No. 1 : It was the intention of Napoleon to 
begin the attack early in the day ; but a heavy 
rain storm occurred on the night of June 17, 1815. 
He found the ground so muddy in the morning as 
to be impassable for artillery and trains ; he was 
therefore compelled to wait until noon before be- 
ginning operations, thereby giving time to Blucher 
to reach the battlefield. Had the action begun two 
hours sooner, he would have arrived too late to 
save Wellington. 

"//'^ No. 2: Another instance is the disaster that 
happened to the French cuirassiers, when a treacher- 
ous guide led them to the sunken road of Ohain, in 
which thousands perished, causing the failure of the 
cavalry assault on the infantry squares that held 
the center of the Allies' line of battle. Here was 
another "i/" that turned the tide of battle. 

As Victor Hugo says: ^^If it had not rained on 
the night between the seventeenth and eighteenth 
of June, 1815, the future of Europe would have 
been changed. Providence only required a cloud, 
crossing the sky at a season when rain was not ex- 
pected, to overthrow an empire. The battle of 
Waterloo could not begin until half past eleven, 
and that delay gave Blucher time to come up.'' 
..." A chain of accidents decided Waterloo." . . 

"//" No. 3 : " Napoleon's catastrophe was brought 
about by a peasant's shake of the head. Thus 
began the loss of the battle." ''If the little shep- 
herd that served as guide to Btilow, Blucher' s lieu- 
tenant, had advised him to debouch from the forest 



21 



above Priestemont instead of below Plancanoit, the 
map of Europe would have been different, for 
Napoleon would have won the battle of Waterloo. 
By another road than that below Plancanoit, the 
Prussian army would have come upon a ravine im- 
passable by artillery, and Blilow would not have 
arrived on the battlefield.'^ 

Other accidents, — other "^/'s," — might be 
named that decided Waterloo. " Ifs " often upset 
the best planned campaigns, and defeat the ablest 
commanders without fault on their part. '^Ifs" 
baffled Napoleon, at Waterloo, as they baffled 
Hooker at Chancellorsville. 

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were the begin- 
ning and the end of one campaign. Gettysburg was 
Hooker's revenge for Chancellorsville. The armies 
of Hooker and Lee were both ready for decisive re- 
sults. Hooker, in May, chose Virginia as his field 
of operations, but his injury required a brief period of 
recuperation. Lee profited by the chance to trans- 
fer the battle ground to Pennsylvania; he moved 
toward the Potomac, threatening the Capital and 
Baltimore, closely followed by Hooker, but he re- 
peated Hooker's mistake at Chancellorsville and sent 
off his cavalry, under Stuart, on a useless raid through 
Maryland and Pennsylvania. Without Stuart, Lee 
was blindfolded, as Hooker was in the Wilderness. 
Hooker now profited by the presence of Pleasonton 
and his superb cavalry corps, masked our advance, 
put our army on Lee's flank, threatening his com- 
munications, before he knew Hooker had crossed the 



22 



Potomac, — thus forcing the enemy to accept battle 
on our own terms. Gettysburg was won by the army 
reorganized by Hooker. It was won because Meade 
adopted Hooker's plan of campaign, after Hooker was 
reheved, just prior to the battle. 

Meade's campaign was shaped by Hooker's 
movements and executed by Butterfield, Hooker's 
Chief of Staff. The battlefield was determined by 
the unforeseen collision of drifting columns of the two 
armies of Lee and Meade. Lee was so confident of 
success that he waited only for the concentration of 
his army to attack wherever he might find us. The 
battle of Gettysburg began on July 1, '63, three 
days after Hooker asked to be relieved from command, 
and, as General Newton said, ''We were hammered 
by the enemy into a strong position, and won." If 
Hooker had remained in command, Lee would not 
have been permitted to take his army back to Vir- 
ginia ; but the fruits of our victory were not harvested. 
History will award to Hooker a large share of the 
honors of the Gettysburg campaign. This verdict, 
however, was anticipated when Congress gave the 
thanks of the nation to Major General Joseph 
Hooker for the ''skill, knowledge and endurance 
which first covered Washington and Baltimore from 
the meditated blow of the advancing and powerful 
army of the rebels, led by General Robert E. Lee." 

It cannot have escaped your notice that there is 
usually a popular disposition to remember a failure 
and to forget a success. How seldom one hears 
of Hooker at Williamsburg, or Fredericksburg, or 



23 



Antietam, or Wauhatchie, or Lookout Mountain, 
Missionary Ridge, or Resaca, or at Peach Tree Creek 
— one of Hooker's most brilliant battles ; but of 
Chancellorsville people are never silent, j The imagi- 
nation of critics is exhausted to find grounds of re- 
proach ; and Hooker's critics, in their desperation, at 
one time insisted that at Chancellorsville he was 
drunk. This accusation took form enough, fortu- 
nately, to be investigated by the Congressional Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War. They reported, 
after a searching inquiry, that there was no foun- 
dation whatever for the slander. Lincoln might have 
said of Hooker, as he said when a similar falsehood 
was told of Grant in the West, '^I wish I knew where 
he got his whisky, I would send a barrel of it to 
every army headquarters." 

I may add my own testimony to refute this impu- 
tation. In the Chancellorsville campaign I was in 
communication with General Hooker almost every 
hour in the day. He was always sober, always alert, 
always vigilant, until prostrated by the cruel in- 
jury he received on the balcony of the Chancellor 
House during the battle of May 3. I served under 
Hooker in 1861-62, on the Lower Potomac, and all 
through the Peninsular campaign, and in Burnside's 
Fredericksburg campaign. I spent a month with 
him, as his guest, in Sherman's campaign in 1864. 
I served under him as a Division, Corps, Grand 
Division, Army, and Department commander in 
1861-2-3-5, and I always found him efficient, capa- 
ble, energetic and sober. 



24 

Hooker was often reminded of Hadley, the home 
of his boyhood, when he looked from the heights of 
Lookout Mountain. The Tennessee, hke the Con- 
necticut River, winds itself around a peninsula in the 
valley, the counterpart of Hadley. It is called Moc- 
casin Bend. Yet how different the picture on the 
eventful day of the battle of Lookout Mountain ! 
In Hadley, on the banks of the Connecticut, all was 
peaceful repose ; while around the head of the un- 
moved warrior on the heights of Lookout, above the 
clouds, the storm of conflict raged in wildest fury. 
Hooker and I rode over the battlefields of Wau- 
hatchie, Lookout Mountain, Chickamauga and Mis- 
sionary Ridge in April, '64. He had been in camp 
during the winter on the slope of the mountain, over- 
looking the valley. 

- Hooker was a master of military narrative. His 
style was concise, clear, vivid, stirring. His official 
reports are models of picturesque description. From 
them history can be transcribed, as he wrote it. 
They contain many admirable topographical sketches, 

— in pen and ink, — so well defined that from these 
reports accurate maps of the scene of operations may 
be outlined. His eye seemed to take at once a photo- 
graphic impression of the field, in which valleys and 
hills, roads and streams, forests and clearings and 
landmarks were distinctly shown. He was a born 
topographer. ^ 

* Hooker enjoyed a campaign. He was indifferent 
to hardships, exposure or peril. * We were rechning 
one afternoon in May, '64, near Calhoun, in Georgia, 



25 



at a halting place, after a hot march, and had un- 
saddled our horses to freshen the animals and because 
we needed the saddles for pillows. I asked him what 
he regarded as the highest form of human enjoyment. 
He answered, ''Campaigning in an enemy's country." 
He was happier in a tent than he could have been in a 
palace. Hooker had humor and wit. He said ''he 
always caught cold when he slept in a house." He 
complained at Malvern Hill that when he had a guide 
he was usually led to the wrong road. He was al- 
ways afraid of guides. He remembered, perhaps, 
what happened to Napoleon's cavalry at Waterloo, 
who were destroyed by the mistake or treachery of a 
guide. After Ringgold, Grant said that Hooker had 
lost too many men in his pursuit of the enemy, — 
striking Bragg when at bay. Hooker replied that he 
"knew no way of swimming without getting wet." 
He said to me at Fredericksburg that military com- 
manders might sometimes learn a profitable lesson 
from Rocky Mountain mules, that is to say, "Be 
sure of safe footing for three legs before taking a step 
forward with the fourth." 

Soldiers soon take on the traits of their commanders. 
When you know a captain, you see his company. A 
regiment is the counterpart of its colonel, — an army 
of its chief. The maker's name is always on the 
handle. At Resaca, Hooker was ordered by Thomas 
to take a strong redoubt covering the enemy's line of 
retreat. Two or three assaults made by the West- 
ern troops had failed. I happened to be Hooker's 
guest at his headquarters. He said to me: "I 



26 

will capture that work to-day at any cost. We are 
serving here, but we belong to the Army of the Poto- 
mac. I owe this much to that army." Tremain/ 
now critically ill, unhappily, — then my senior aide- 
de-camp, — volunteered his services to lead one of the 
columns of Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps, 
which was selected for the assault. As you may sup- 
pose, I was an attentive spectator of the proceedings. 
The enemy was driven from the redoubt, but we could 
not occupy it nor take away any of the guns, because 
the work was found to be commanded by thousands 
of the enemy intrenched on the flanks and rear. 
Night closed the combat. Not a man on either side 
could live within the fort ; it was deserted. Assail- 
ants and defenders slept on their arms, our men on 
the slope of the hill crowned by the redoubt, the en- 
emy in their rifle pits. About nine o'clock, while we 
were talking over the incidents of the day, in Hooker's 
tent, we heard loud cheers. Going out to learn 
the news, we were met by a detachment hauling the 
guns of the redoubt to Hooker's headquarters. His 
men had profited by the night to scrape down with 
their hands and bayonets the embrasures for the 
guns, and, thus opening the way, had run the cannon 
down the hillside and brought their well-won trophies 
to their chief, of whom his men were the type in 
determination, tenacity and pluck. 

Alas ! I must not dwell too long on these tempting 
themes. You know there is a dangerous fascination 
in fighting our battles o'er again. Hooker's character 
1 He died on December 10, 1910. 



27 



was thoroughl}^ military. He was fit for command. 
He was proud of the profession of arms. He brought 
to it the highest accomplishm_ents of a soldier. His 
manner and bearing were distinguished, yet urbane 
and gentle. His temper was quick, yet forgiving. 
He was diligent and punctilious in the discharge of 
duty. Toward all under his command he was ex- 
acting in discipline ; inexorable to the laggard ; 
prodigal in praise to the intrepid and diligent. He 
always bowed to superior authority with the same 
loyalty that he demanded from his own troops. He 
never sulked in his tent when summoned to battle. 
He supported McClellan, Burnside, Thomas, 
Sherman and Grant with unfaltering fidelity and zeal. 

I am here to-night in the presence of those Hooker 
loved, — his comrades and his friends. He was a 
patriot. He has passed into history with the great 
characters of ^61 to '65. He was a favorite of 
Lincoln. He filled glorious pages of our American an- 
nals. He was a loyal son of Massachusetts. He was 
proud of her soldiers, many of whom he led in bat- 
tle, and among all her soldiers he was the foremost. 
His name and fame honor this grand old Common- 
wealth. I am glad Massachusetts has erected a 
splendid monument to Hooker. He deserved one. 

And now, comrades and friends, I must take leave 
of you ; my theme is by no means exhausted. I 
would gladly prolong my address, were it not for the 
fear that I might weary you. When we speak of 
those we love, it is difficult to stop. 

I might have recalled Hooker's earlier exploits in the 



28 



Seminole War, in Florida ; I might have reminded you 
of his brilliant services in Mexico, from 1846 to '48 
under Scott, in that wonderful campaign from San 
Juan de Ulloa and Cerro Gordo, to Contreras, Churu- 
busco, Molino del Rey and the Gates of Mexico, 
in which Scott and Taylor and Wool and Doniphan 
conquered an empire, with twenty thousand men, — 
half of them volunteers ! 

I have told you of Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Oak 
Ridge, Glendale and Malvern Hill in the Peninsular 
campaign, and Antietam, under McClellan, in the great 
war for the preservation of the Union ; I have recalled 
Hooker's triumphs on Lookout Mountain and at 
Missionary Ridge under Grant and Thomas ; I have 
touched upon Hooker's unappreciated service under 
Sherman, at Resaca, Kenesaw Mountain, Peach 
Tree Creek and other battles, in which he won endur- 
ing fame. I have shown that in the Chancellorsville 
campaign he would have been successful if he had 
been loyally supported by all of his corps com- 
manders and had escaped the cruel injury that 
paralyzed him. 

History will inscribe Hooker's name in her list of 
great commanders. History will accord to him the 
justice denied to him by his contemporaries. He is 
not alone among the great soldiers to whom govern- 
ments have been unjust and ungrateful. Napoleon 
had his Waterloo, but France will never forget his 
great campaigns. Shall America ever forget Hooker's 
brilliant achievements in three wars, in which he was 
always a heroic figure? Never! Never! It is sad 



29 



to believe that Hooker and McClellan, and perhaps 
Thomas, in their last days, were broken-hearted when 
they mourned over the ingratitude of the Republic 
they had so ably and so nobly served. But Hooker 
had the consolation of knowing that among the troops 
he led in many battles he was ever uppermost in their 
hearts. And he knew besides that, above all, in 
this grand old Commonwealth of Massachusetts his 
fame will live forever. 




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